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Lay abstract (229/250 words) 
The autism spectrum is full of variation both in terms of the range of symptoms and 
differences between individuals. Even so, it is possible that a single cause might be present 
underneath this diversity in all individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). This study 
focussed on three well-known cognitive differences that are thought to affect the way people 
with ASD process information: Theory of Mind (ToM), Executive Function (EF) and a Local 
Processing Bias (LB). Thirty-one high-functioning children with ASD and thirty-seven 
children with neurotypical development of similar age, gender and intelligence completed 
several ToM, EF and LB tasks. Everyday behaviours were also assessed through parent and 
teacher questionnaires, parent interview and direct observation. We found that ToM and EF 
difficulties were common and performance on these tasks could be used to accurately divide 
most of the children into those with and without ASD. Performance on ToM tasks was 
related to performance on EF tasks but neither related to any of the everyday behaviours. 
Only a small group of individuals with ASD had a LB, which did not relate to the other 
measures; a LB may be the cause of symptoms that were not included in an ASD diagnosis. 
Future studies may reinforce the idea that there is a single cause of ASD in all affected 
individuals. 
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Scientific abstract 
The autism spectrum is characterised by genetic and behavioural heterogeneity. However, it 
is still unknown whether there is a universal pattern of cognitive impairment in autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD) and whether multiple cognitive impairments are needed to explain 
the full range of behavioural symptoms. This study aimed to determine whether three widely 
acknowledged cognitive abnormalities (Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment, Executive 
Function (EF) impairment and the presence of a Local Processing Bias (LB)) are universal 
and fractionable in autism, and whether the relationship between cognition and behaviour is 
dependent on the method of behavioural assessment. Thirty-one high-functioning children 
with ASD and thirty-seven children with neurotypical development (NTD), comparable in 
age, gender and IQ, completed several tasks tapping into ToM, EF and LB, and autistic 
symptomatology was assessed through parental and teacher questionnaires, parental 
interview and direct observation. We found that ToM and EF deficits differentiated the 
groups and some ToM and EF tasks were related to each other. ToM and EF were together 
able to correctly classify more than three-quarters of the children into cases and controls, 
despite relating to none of the specific behavioural measures. Only a small subgroup of 
individuals displayed a LB, which was unrelated to ToM and EF, and did not aid diagnostic 
classification, most likely contributing to non-diagnostic symptoms in a subgroup. Despite 
the characteristic heterogeneity of the autism spectrum, it remains a possibility therefore that 
a single cognitive cause may underlie the range of diagnostic symptoms in all individuals 
with autism. 
 
Keywords: Autism Spectrum Disorders, Cognition, Theory of Mind, Executive Function, 
Local Bias, Fractionation, Symptomatology, and Behaviour 
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Exploring ‘The Autisms’ at a Cognitive Level 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is now widely accepted as a neurodevelopmental 
disorder with a genetic basis resulting in atypical brain development, although relatively little 
is known about the exact genetic or biological abnormalities underlying the disorder 
(Betancur, 2011; Gliga, Jones, Bedford, Charman, & Johnson, 2014; Goldani, Downs, 
Widjaja, Lawton, & Hendren, 2014; Happé & Ronald, 2008; Lai, Lombardo, & Baron-
Cohen, 2013). An ASD diagnosis therefore relies upon a defined set of behavioural criteria, 
encompassing social interaction and communication difficulties and the presence of repetitive 
behaviours (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). A behavioural diagnosis has 
the disadvantage of heterogeneity: there can be many different causes of the same behaviour, 
or equally, different behaviours in different individuals can result from the same underlying 
cause due to interaction with other factors (Rutter, 2000). Indeed, the shopping list-style 
diagnostic criteria (Morton, 2008) expect and furthermore embrace behavioural 
heterogeneity, leading the term ‘the autisms’ (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007) to enter the 
literature. 
While it is acknowledged that different individuals vary wildly in their personal 
presentation of this shared diagnostic label (Geschwind, 2009; Munson, Faja, Meltzoff, 
Abbott, & Dawson, 2008; Ronald, Happé, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin, 2006), this same 
heterogeneity is much harder to reconcile at a causal level of explanation. Still, heterogeneity 
is clearly evident at the genetic level (Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008; O'Roak et al., 2012), 
leading the field to pursue endophenotypic markers that can homogeneously draw subgroups 
of individuals together (Charman et al., 2007) and heterogeneity certainly appears to decrease 
as we travel down the causal chain from genetics to cognition. There is convergence from 
genetics to neurobiology (Geschwind & Levitt, 2007; Zoghbi, 2003) and similarly from 
cellular to systems neuroscience (Amaral, Schumann, & Nordahl, 2008). Whilst theories 
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abound at the cognitive level, Theory of Mind (ToM), executive function (EF) and a local 
processing bias (LB) remain the most prominent (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Frith, 2012; 
Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007) drawing together diverse biological and behavioural findings. 
The ToM account of ASD, a difficulty representing the mental states of others, was proposed 
by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) as a cognitive explanation for the socio-
communicative impairment. The EF account originally aimed to explain the repetitive and 
stereotyped behaviours through a lack of higher order control processes such as planning, 
flexibility and inhibition (Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991), but has since also 
attempted to account for the socio-communicative symptoms (Bishop & Norbury, 2005a). 
The third account, LB, aims to explain why individuals with ASD have trouble integrating 
information but also show “islets of ability”, through a tendency to process local details at the 
expense of global meaning (Frith, 1989; Happé & Frith, 2006). 
It has thus been suggested that there may not be a unitary underlying cause of autism at 
any level and that leaving the “single explanation” approach behind may be the key to 
identifying the genetic and neurocognitive origins of autism (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 
2006); it seems likely that a number of different mechanisms are required to explain different 
aspects of autistic symptomatology (Happé & Ronald, 2008). While such fractionation is 
evident at the behavioural level, it is still unclear whether the different proposed cognitive 
impairments in autism are similarly separable (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014); very few studies 
have examined ToM, EF and LB simultaneously in ASD and these findings have been 
contradictory (Brunsdon et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2012; Lam, 2013; Pellicano, Maybery, 
Durkin, & Maley, 2006). Furthermore, only one of these studies (Pellicano et al., 2006) has 
examined the relationship between cognition and symptomatology, finding no associations, 
and hence it is unknown whether these cognitive impairments really can explain independent 
aspects of autistic behaviour; it is conceivable that the tasks used to tap into these cognitive 
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difficulties may instead measure constructs related to ASD but independent of the core 
symptoms, such as language or intelligence. One as yet unexplored possibility is that the 
detection of relationships between cognition and symptomatology may be dependent on the 
tool used to evaluate diagnostic symptoms, whether assessed through parent or teacher report, 
through interview or direct observation. The present study aims to provide further evidence to 
inform the fractionation debate at the cognitive and behavioural levels. 
The idea of fractionating autism addresses the proposal that there is no mechanism at 
any level of causality that is sufficient to explain the totality of the autistic syndrome. Inter-
individual heterogeneity addresses a subtly different issue: that there is no causal mechanism 
common to all individuals, a notion that is also widely presumed to be true but which has 
received much less empirical attention (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). In fact, inter-individual 
heterogeneity has even been suggested to be a more distinct marker for autism than any one 
neuropathology (Towgood, Meuwese, Gilbert, Turner, & Burgess, 2009), attempting to 
explain why one study may find support for and the next find no evidence in favour of a 
particular underlying deficit. It remains an open question whether there is a universal pattern 
of impairment that can draw together all individuals with autism, or whether there is truth in 
the term ‘the autisms’ not just at a behavioural level but also at a causal level of explanation. 
The present study aims to address this issue. 
This study therefore attempts to shed light on the following:  
1) Are the cognitive impairments ToM, EF and LB fractionable in ASD? 
2) Are any of these cognitive impairments common to all individuals with ASD? 
3) Do these cognitive impairments predict autistic symptomatology? 
 4)   Is the relationship between cognition and behaviour dependent on the method of 
behavioural assessment? 
We approached these questions by examining all three cognitive domains (ToM, EF 
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and LB) in a group of high-functioning children with ASD as well as a group of children with 
neurotypical development (NTD), comparable in age, gender and IQ. We used several tasks 
within each domain to ensure the validity of the cognitive measures and, given the propensity 
in the literature for high-functioning individuals with ASD to pass such tests, we selected 
tasks that have previously been found to be sensitive. We planned to study group differences 
to identify impairments relevant to autism, as well as individual performance by identifying 
outliers in each cognitive domain to tackle the issue of universality. Calculating correlations 
between these variables would allow us to address the question of fractionation, as would 
patterns of impairment in each individual. In addition, the children were comprehensively 
assessed with widely used instruments of autistic symptomatology, including parental and 
teacher questionnaires, parental interview and direct observation, enabling us to investigate 
whether cognitive task performance could predict the behavioural symptoms of ASD and 
whether this was dependent on the method of behavioural assessment. 
Method 
The study was approved by the Ethical Committee, Region of Southern Denmark (S-
20090071). 
Participants 
The ASD group was recruited from two Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
in the Region of Southern Denmark by searching the Patient Administrative System for date 
of birth (8-12 year olds) and ICD-10 diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental Disorder (F84.0-
84.9). The diagnostic files were reviewed and children who did not fulfil an ASD-diagnosis 
or had a full-scale IQ (FSIQ) below 70 were excluded. A total of 82 clinically diagnosed 
children with ASD were invited to participate in the study, of which 54 families responded, 
from which 37 children agreed to participate. Three additional cases were recruited from 
special education schools for children with ASD. 
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Participants in the ASD group were only included if they also met DSM-IV-TR criteria 
for an ASD at the time of the assessment. An individual clinical conference of trained 
clinicians included all previous diagnostic information in conjunction with current scores on 
the ADOS and ADI-R (see below), and formed the basis for confirmation of diagnosis. At 
this stage, 11 children met the criteria for Autistic Disorder, 7 for Asperger’s Syndrome and 
17 for Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS). As the 
study aims were relevant to the whole autism spectrum, all of these children were included. 
The remaining 5 children no longer fulfilled diagnostic criteria for an ASD and were 
excluded. Four further children were excluded due to current FSIQ below 70 (estimated from 
three verbal and three performance subtests from the Danish translation of the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale of Children, WISC-III, Wechsler, 2003) leaving a total of 31 for analyses.  
The NTD children (N=37) were recruited from four mainstream schools using similar 
inclusion criteria (FSIQ>70, age: 8-12 years). None of the NTD participants had elevated 
scores on the SRS or SCQ questionnaires (see below) or were reported to have any 
developmental disorder or family history of such difficulties. 
The groups did not significantly differ on gender (X2(1)=0.97), age (t(63)=0.32), 
performance IQ (t(66)=0.60), verbal IQ (t(64)=1.48) or full-scale IQ (t(66)=1.48). The 
majority of children were Caucasian and from middle-class families, and we found no 
significant difference in their parents’ educational level (X2(1)=.29), defined by the highest-
ranking parent’s education (more/less than 13 years education; see table 1). 
Behavioural assessment of symptoms 
For the ASD group, symptomatology was measured using the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS, Lord et al., 2000) and Autism Diagnostic Interview, 
Revised (ADI-R, Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) to observe the child’s behaviour in a 
clinical setting and assess parents’ perception of their child’s disabilities (see table 1). All 
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children reached the cut-off in ADOS social interaction, but seven fell below cut-off in 
communication, and six did not reach the total cut-off. 
Symptomatology scores were recorded for both groups from parents and teachers using 
two questionnaires: the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS, Constantino et al., 2003) and the 
Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ, formerly the Autism Screening Questionaire, 
Berument, Rutter, Lord, Pickles, & Bailey, 1999). Significant group differences were found 
on both questionnaires for parents (SRS, t(35)=11.734, p<0.001; SCQ, t(36)=9.926, p<0.001) 
and teachers (SRS, t(42)=9.570, p<0.001; SCQ, t(43)=4.710, p<0.001). Interestingly, parents 
in the ASD group tended to rate their children as having significantly more symptoms than 
the teachers did (SRS, t(27)=2.671, p=0.013; SCQ, t(26)=2.076, p=0.048), whereas the 
opposite was true for the NTD group on the SCQ (t(22)=3.976, p=0.001; no difference on 
SRS, t(25)=0.609). 
Table 1 about here 
Instruments 
We assessed the cognitive domains, ToM, EF and LB, with a battery containing 
multiple cognitive tasks within each domain to ensure the validity of the cognitive measures. 
These tasks, the outcome measures and references to the procedures used are shown in table 
2. 
For the ToM tasks, excellent agreement was reached (intraclass correlation coefficients: 
Strange Stories, 0.989; Frith-Happé Animations, 0.946) between the first author and a corater 
blind to group (20% of responses randomly selected). 
Table 2 about here 
Results 
As IQ and age varied greatly in these samples and both variables correlated to the 
majority of task measures, we chose to calculate individual performance levels for each task 
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independent of IQ and age. We entered data from the NTD group as the dependent variable in 
a regression with FSIQ and age as the predictor variables, the resulting regression equation 
was applied to the ASD group, and residuals were collected for both groups. These were 
converted to z-scores in relation to the NTD group’s mean and standard deviation and used in 
all further analyses. To detect individuals in the ASD group with deviant performance on 
each measure, any NTD group outliers performing more than 1.65 standard deviations (SDs) 
below the NTD group mean were first removed in order to obtain a better estimate of normal 
performance, regardless of NTD children who might have performed abnormally on any one 
task. Deviant performance was defined as below the 5th centile (1.65 SD) of this corrected 
NTD group performance (White et al., 2006). 
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
The ASD group performed significantly worse than the NTD group on the Strange 
Stories assessing mental state inferences (t(44)=3.10, p=0.003). We did not find a significant 
difference between the groups on any other story type (ps>0.08). For the Frith-Happé 
Animations, we found significant group differences in both the appropriateness and 
intentionality of answers in the ToM condition (t(50.7)=4.63 and t(51.3)=4.28, ps<0.001). 
The ASD group’s answers were also less appropriate in the GD condition (t(66)=3.39, 
p=0.001). 
We found positive correlations between the mental state Strange Stories and both of the 
ToM scores from the Frith-Happé Animations (r=0.326, p=0.007 & r=0.272, p=0.025), 
although these did not hold in the groups separately. Nevertheless, given both tasks were 
designed to tap into the same theoretical construct, we combined each individual’s z-scores 
on these ToM measures to create a total ToM score, first averaging the two Frith-Happé 
Animation ToM scores before averaging them with the Strange Stories mental state score. 
This ToM total score also revealed a significant group difference (t(43.2)=5.253, p<0.001) 
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with the ASD group performing on average 2SDs below the NTD group mean (see figure 1). 
Scores can be seen to span the whole range of the NTD group performance but with an 
elongated tail of individuals performing particularly poorly; indeed, 58% of children in the 
ASD group fell below the 5th centile cut-off. 
Figure 1 about here 
Executive function (EF) 
For generativity we found a significant group difference on Verbal Fluency in both 
conditions (letter, t(65.7)=2.935, p=0.005; category, t(54.7)=2.358 p=0.022), and on Pattern 
Meanings in the total number of correct responses (t(63.3)=4.855, p<0.001), with the ASD 
group performing more poorly. On the CANTAB tests, we found no significant group 
difference on any of the sub-scores in the SOC task (min. moves, t(66)=1.107, p=0.272; 
initial thinking, t(66)=1.118, p=0.268; subsequent thinking, t(66)=0.060, p=0.952), in the 
SSP task (t(66)=0.252, p=0.802), in the SWM task (number of errors in each condition, 
t(66)<0.983, ps>0.33; strategy used, t(66)=0.691, p=0.492) or in the IED task (extra 
dimensional shift, t(66)=1.712, p=0.092). 
We found significant correlations between the letter condition in Verbal Fluency and 
the Pattern Meanings task (r=0.428, p<0.001), which held in the NTD (r=0.338, p=0.041) but 
not the ASD group (r=0.287, p=0.117). A total generativity score was calculated as the mean 
of Verbal fluency (mean of both conditions) and Pattern Meanings. Within the CANTAB, the 
SSP and the SWM tasks were correlated (r=0.293, p=0.015), which held in the ASD 
(r=0.517, p=0.003) but not the NTD group (r=0.088, p=0.606). A total mean CANTAB score 
was calculated, where each task was weighted equally. The total CANTAB and total 
generativity scores were then averaged to provide an EF total score, given EF is widely 
acknowledged to encompass a disparate range of functions with the common purpose of 
higher-order control (e.g. Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006). 
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The ASD group performed on average just less than 1SD below the NTD group on this 
EF total score (t(66)=3.856, p<0.001; see figure 1). The overall distribution was quite 
striking; there was significant overlap in the range of scores in the two groups. While 29% of 
children fell below the 5th percentile cut-off, the majority (52%) fell between this cut-off and 
the NTD group mean. 
Local Bias (LB) 
There was a non-significant tendency for children in the ASD group to perform slightly 
better than the NTD group on the EFT (t=1.924, p=0.059). In the HVOT, we did not find a 
significant group difference on the time taken to complete each correct trial (t=1.585, 
p=0.118) or on the number of correct answers (t=1.567, p=0.122). Although there were no 
correlations between the two LB tasks, they were designed to tap into different aspects of the 
same construct and so were combined to give a LB total score, which did not differ 
significantly between the groups (t=0.094, p=0.925). Low z-scores indicated a local bias 
(high EFT and low HVOT). Only 13% of children in the ASD group showed a profile 
indicative of a local processing style, falling below the 5th percentile cut-off. Taking the EFT 
or HVOT separately gave an even smaller number of outliers (EFT: 6%, HVOT: 6%). 
Relationships between cognitive domains 
We found no correlations between the composite scores of the three cognitive domains 
(correlations across the whole sample unless otherwise stated). Given the lack of association 
between many of the elements of the composite scores, we also explored correlations 
between these elements across the different domains. Within ToM, performance on the Frith-
Happé Animations was correlated to the EF composite (r=0.343, p=0.004) and, within EF, 
generativity was correlated to the ToM total score (r=0.299, p=0.013). These correlations 
seemed to be driven by an association specifically between the generativity composite and 
performance on the Frith-Happé Animations (r=0.446, p<0.001). Specifically, analyses 
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showed that the Frith-Happé Animations correlated to Verbal Fluency (letter: r=0.281, 
p=0.020) and Pattern Meanings (r=0.487, p<0.001); this latter correlation also held in the 
ASD group alone r=0.355, p=0.050). Likewise, correlations were found between the 
generativity composite and both the intentionality score (r=0.391, p=0.001) and the 
appropriateness score (r=0.450, p=0.001) in the Frith-Happé animations. 
Patterns of impairment in each individual were studied. While the majority of children 
had a ToM impairment only, Figure 2 shows that individuals exist with most possible 
combinations of impairment. Figure 3 shows specific examples of such combinations, 
portraying individual profiles across these three domains. This reveals that, although rare, the 
less frequent combinations of impairment are not an artefact of the cut-off methodology used; 
children exist with significant impairment in the affected domains whilst having retained 
performance in the remaining domains. Figure 2 further reveals a proportion of children with 
ASD who appear to have no significant cognitive impairments on the tests used here; 16% of 
children fell into this category although none had positive z-scores across all three cognitive 
domains. 
Figures 2&3 about here 
Relationships between cognition and symptomatology 
Relationships between cognitive and behavioural variables were explored in the ASD 
group alone as ADOS and ADI scores were not available for the NTD group. The ToM and 
EF total scores were unrelated to scores on the ADI but the LB total score was negatively 
correlated to a subscale of the ADI communication domain (delay in spoken language 
without attempts to compensate through gestures, r=0.368, p=0.042), indicating that the 
presence of autism-related communication symptoms was associated with a local processing 
bias (this would not withstand correction for multiple comparisons however). Likewise, ToM 
and EF total scores were unrelated to ADOS scores but the LB total score was correlated with 
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a subscale of the ADOS repetitive behaviour domain (stereotypical behaviours, r=0.398, 
p=0.027), indicating that the absence of autism-related stereotypical behaviour was 
associated with a local processing bias (would not withstand correction for multiple 
comparisons). We found no correlations between any cognitive domain and SRS scores or 
subscales; likewise for the SCQ. 
Predicting diagnostic group from cognitive test performance 
Wilks’ discriminant function analysis was used to investigate which cognitive factors 
(ToM, LB or EF) were best able to predict group membership. Variables were entered and 
removed in a step-wise manner. ToM was the best discriminator, correctly classifying 74% of 
children, and EF was found to significantly increase this discrimination to 79% (χ2(2)=36.90, 
Wilks’ lambda=0.57, p<0.001; see Table 3; this increased to 81% when substituting the ToM 
Animations score and Generativity composite). Misclassification occurred equally in both 
groups, indicative of false negatives and false positives. When entered alone, EF classified 
67% correctly. LB was not found to significantly aid in discriminating the groups. 
Table 3 about here 
Discussion 
This case control study aimed to determine whether the cognitive impairments ToM, 
EF and LB are fractionable, and whether any are common to all individuals with autism. 
Furthermore, we aimed to investigate whether these cognitive impairments predict autistic 
symptomatology, and whether the relationship between cognition and behaviour is dependent 
on the method of behavioural assessment. 
We found that ToM and EF deficits differentiated children with ASD from those with 
neurotypical development at a group level and a proportion of individuals were characterised 
by each difficulty. Together, these abilities were able to correctly classify more than three-
quarters of children into cases and controls. Furthermore, these cognitive impairments 
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appeared to be related to each other, suggesting a lack of fractionation between these 
domains. On the other hand, we found little support for the presence of a LB in autism, with 
only a small subgroup of individuals affected. Performance in this domain was unrelated to 
ToM and EF, indicating fractionation and that this processing style may explain specific 
aspects of autistic symptomatology that are present only in a small subgroup. We found no 
evidence that performance on ToM and EF tasks predicted autistic symptomatology 
regardless of the method of behavioural assessment. 
Cognitive universality 
Our ToM results at a group level are consistent with other studies of autism finding a 
group difference on the ToM-condition in the Frith-Happé Animations (Abell, Happé, & 
Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Salter, Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence, & 
Skuse, 2008) and in the Strange Stories vignettes that assessed mental state inference 
(Kaland, Callesen, Moller-Nielsen, Mortensen, & Smith, 2008; Spek, Scholte, & Van 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010; Velloso Rde, Duarte, & Schwartzman, 2013; White, Hill, Happé, & 
Frith, 2009), as well as with those studies assessing performance across multiple cognitive 
domains (Brunsdon et al., 2014; Lai et al., 2012; Lam, 2013; Pellicano et al., 2006). Despite 
great diversity in the tasks and methods used, ToM is consistently found to be impaired. 
Further, we found here that 58% of children with ASD performed within the bottom 5th 
centile of neurotypical performance, and that ToM alone was able to correctly predict 
diagnostic status for 74% of children. This indicates that the ToM impairment may be the 
most frequently-occurring, well-specified and robust impairment, as well as being clinically 
relevant. With more sensitive tests (e.g. Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009), a ToM 
impairment may well be present in an even larger proportion of children with ASD. Whether 
this holds true across the full span of development is a matter for future investigation. 
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Likewise, EF impairment seems to be quite reliably identified across studies (for 
reviews, see: Hill, 2004; Russo et al., 2007), including in 4 out of 5 cross-domain studies 
(present study included). There appears to be an attenuating effect across EF tasks however: 
only a proportion of tasks produce group differences in each study and there is variability in 
which tests give rise to group differences across studies (Russo et al., 2007). Here, our 
significant group difference in the EF domain was largely driven by the poor performance of 
the ASD group on the generativity tasks (which support previous findings on generativity, 
Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Bishop & Norbury, 2005b; Turner, 1999). 
Indeed, no group differences were seen on any CANTAB test, a finding that is not unusual 
(Corbett, Constantine, Hendren, Rocke, & Ozonoff, 2009; Goldberg et al., 2005). One 
possible explanation lies in the computerised administration of the CANTAB; a participant’s 
ability to infer the experimenter’s intentions may affect test performance in an experimenter-
administered situation (see Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008; White, 2013), 
although Williams and Jarrold (2013) have recently published evidence to the contrary. 
Another possibility is that the verbal nature of the generativity tasks, rather than the EF 
properties, posed a problem for the children with ASD. Despite this, the EF composite placed 
29% of children with ASD in the bottom 5th centile of neurotypical performance, and 
significantly strengthened the group classification algorithm. Furthermore, the EF composite 
alone correctly classified 67% of children into their diagnostic groups, indicating that our 5th 
centile cut-off technique may have been overly conservative. An EF impairment certainly 
appears to be present in a substantial subgroup of individuals with autism. 
The presence of a LB in autism has the weakest support both from the general autism 
literature (Happé & Frith, 2006) as well as from cross-domain studies (2 out of 5 studies, 
present study included); even when significant effects are identified, it remains unclear 
whether these are driven by an enhancement in local processing or a deficit in global 
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processing. Our finding of a non-significant trend for enhanced local processing is certainly 
within the range of previous results. The lack of effect on our global processing task could be 
due to the choice of task and instructions given; it is possible that participants were able to 
identify the object by looking at a single piece rather than attempting to combine the pieces. 
This may have been avoided by using the modified version of the task (Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 2001) where the combined picture cannot be interpreted from the fragments. 
Together, our tasks classified only 13% of children as displaying a LB. If a LB is present in 
only a small subsample of the autistic population, this could explain the lack of group 
differences often reported in this domain. 
One possible limitation to the study’s ability to address the issue of universality is the 
inclusion criteria. With the advent of more conservative diagnostic criteria, it is 
acknowledged that some of the children may not have met criteria for an ASD as defined by 
DSM-5 (2013). This is likely to have increased heterogeneity, decreasing the probability of 
finding a universal cognitive impairment. We were unfortunately unable to reassess each case 
against DSM-5 criteria; we may well have found ToM and EF impairments and a LB in a 
larger proportion of children if we had been able to exclude children who did not meet DSM-
5 criteria. If this proves true, assessment of cognitive atypicalities could provide an objective 
means of identifying ASD as an aid to current clinical practice. 
Cognitive fractionation 
Across the cognitive functions, measures were generally unrelated, most possible 
combinations of impairment were found in different children with ASD, and individual 
profiles revealed double dissociations between cognitive domains. While this paints a picture 
of cognitive fractionation in autism, we did find a strong relationship between generativity 
and ToM performance on the Frith-Happé animations; ToM and EF also classified very 
similar sets of children into their diagnostic groups. It seems likely that these specific ToM 
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and EF tests were related here either due to overlapping task demands (cf. verbal tasks and 
tasks requiring inference of the experimenter’s intentions) or because these two cognitive 
processes fundamentally rely on a common neurocognitive mechanism (e.g. predictive 
coding, Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Despite a lack of clarity as 
to the roots of this association, the past literature in ASD certainly supports the existence of 
such a relationship (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Ozonoff et al., 1991; Pellicano, 2007; 
Zelazo, 2002). Similar to our results, Pellicano (2007) found a correlation between ToM and 
EF and argued that EF was crucial for the development of ToM in children with ASD 
because impaired ToM was seen with intact EF but not vice versa. While this pattern has 
been interpreted as indicating developmental primacy of EF, an alternative possibility is that 
EF difficulties are simply less common and/or less severe and therefore have less explanatory 
power. Further, we found EF impairments alone in four children in the present study. Later, 
Pellicano (2010) supported her hypothesis by finding that EF and LB predicted change in 
ToM longitudinally; further such work using a variety of methodologies is desperately 
needed to explore this relationship in greater depth. Whatever draws these domains of ToM 
and EF together may prove to be a key cognitive component impaired in autism. 
On the other hand, the presence of a LB certainly appears to be fractionated from the 
ToM and EF impairments. However, the importance of this atypical processing style appears 
limited given its very low prevalence. 
Cognition to behaviour 
To the best of our knowledge, only one study (Pellicano et al., 2006) has previously 
assessed correlations between multiple cognitive domains and symptomatology, and the few 
associations they found failed to survive correction for multiple comparisons. Even though 
we included multiple measures that probed behavioural symptomatology in different ways, 
associations between cognitive performance and behavioural symptomatology in the present 
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study were similarly sporadic and weak. Surprisingly, LB was the only domain that was 
correlated with symptomatology, being associated with less stereotypical behaviours on the 
ADOS and delay in spoken language without attempts to compensate through gestures on the 
ADI-R. These correlations were unexpected and did not survive Bonferroni correction. 
This lack of association across multiple methodologies and across two studies now, 
raises the question of construct validity of the behavioural and cognitive test measures. While 
both clearly differentiate the autistic from the neurotypical group, it is possible that tests at 
either or both levels of representation are tapping into variance in some factor orthogonal to 
the one intended. Behavioural measures are intrinsically liable to the subjective opinion of 
the parent, teacher or experimenter, and the behaviours of interest are susceptible to being 
overshadowed by individual differences in intelligence, language, personality, education etc. 
This could be tested by including items that explicitly ask about ToM, EF and LB abilities, in 
order to assess whether parent and teacher reports, and indeed experimenter judgements, are a 
reliable proxy for cognitive test performance. Cognitive measures are likewise rarely pure 
measures of a single cognitive process. Recent work looking at more implicit measures 
(Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Senju, 2012; Sodian & Thoermer, 2008) holds promise 
for tapping more directly into the cognitive impairments underlying autism. 
 
In summary, our multi-domain study of cognition in autism indicated that difficulties 
on ToM and EF tasks characterise the majority of cases, raising the possibility that one or 
both may after all prove to be universal in autism given more sensitive cognitive measures. If 
so, this would counter the idea of ‘the autisms’ at least at the cognitive level and indicate that 
the spectrum should be approached as a unitary disorder. Our results also contribute to 
understanding fractionation in autism: ToM and EF were related, although the exact nature of 
this association has yet to be determined. ToM and EF were also the only variables to display 
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clinical relevance, together distinguishing the vast majority of cases from controls, despite a 
lack of specific associations between cognitive and behavioural measures. While a LB 
appears to be fractionated from ToM and EF, it was detected in only a few children and did 
not improve diagnostic classification, most likely contributing to non-diagnostic symptoms in 
a subgroup. Despite the characteristic heterogeneity of the autism spectrum, it remains a 
possibility that a single cognitive cause may underlie the range of diagnostic symptoms in all 
individuals with autism. 
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Table 1: Participants characteristics; means with standard deviations (SD) in parentheses and 
range below.  
Measure ASD group NTD group 
N (Male:Female) 31 (25:6) 37 (26:11) 
Age 10.98 (1.37) 
(8.1-12.8)  
10.87 (1.33) 
(8.3-12.8)  
Performance IQ  102.06 (18.10) 
(76-137) 
108.59 (18.22) 
(64-134) 
Verbal IQ  104.77 (13.94) 
(64-132) 
102.57 (16.30) 
(80-143) 
Full-scale IQ  104.45 (16.04) 
(75-139) 
107.46 (18.27) 
(75-145) 
Parents’ educational level 
(higher:lower) 
19:12 25:12 
SCQa, parents*** 16.74 (7.30) 
(2-30) 
3.09 (2.39) 
(0-9) 
SCQb, teachers*** 12.81 (5.54) 
(3-24) 
6.83 (3.31) 
(2-14) 
SRSc, parents*** 91.41 (30.99) 
(38-140) 
19.51 (12.09) 
(5-54) 
SRSd, teachers*** 71.90 (28.22) 
(32-155) 
16.84 (13.04) 
(1-56) 
ADOS total 9.90 (3.67) 
(4-22) 
- 
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ADI total 30.39 (14.26) 
(9-79) 
- 
a N=31:33 
b N=27:23 
c N=29:33 
d N=20:26 
*** p<0.001
EXPLORING ”THE AUTISMS” AT A COGNITIVE LEVEL 29 
 
Table 2: Cognitive tasks (sorted by domain) with reference to previous studies describing the 
task procedure.
